Proceedings of the 50th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2017

Securing Birth Certificate Documents with DNA Profiles
Mark F. Tannian
Independent Researcher
tannianmf-hicss@yahoo.com

Christina Schweikert
St. John’s University
schweikc@stjohns.edu

Abstract
The birth certificate is a document used by a
person to obtain identification and licensing
documents throughout their lifetime. For identity
verification, the birth certificate provides limited
information to support a person’s claim of identity.
Authentication to the birth certificate is strictly a
matter of possession. DNA profiling is becoming a
commodity analysis that can be done accurately in
under two hours with little human intervention. The
DNA profile is a superior biometric to add to a birth
record because it is stable throughout a person’s life
and beyond. Acceptability of universal DNA profiling
will depend heavily on privacy and safety concerns.
This paper uses the U.S. FBI CODIS profile as a basis
to discuss the effectiveness of DNA profiling and to
provide a practical basis for a discussion of potential
privacy and authenticity controls. As is discussed,
adopting DNA profiles to improve document security
should be done cautiously.

1. Introduction
A birth certificate is a document that enables a
person to obtain genuine identification and licensing
documentation years after birth. The birth certificate is
referred to as a breeder document. The birth certificate
provides limited information to an identity verifier.
The birth certificate, as means for identity
authentication, is less reliable than identification and
licensing documents obtained later in life, such as a
driver’s license or passport. Unlike the passport or
driver’s license, historically the birth certificate has
been a static document, meaning its contents are never
renewed or refreshed.
Recently a birth certificate or certificate of live
birth has been implemented as an electronic record [4]
when submitted to an appropriate jurisdictional vital
records agency by one of approximately 6,400 entities
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that are authorized birth certificate issuers in the
United States [10]. The electronic record contains
public health related fields that are not commonly seen
on the document typically associated with the term
“birth certificate.” A second document titled “Birth
Certificate” or “Certificate of Live Birth” is what
individuals typically consider the document of their
birth. This second birth document is issued to
individuals by a vital records agency, and primarily
contains information including a child’s name, birth
date, birthplace, gender and parent information.
Possession of the birth certificate is the dominant
means of proving the identity on the certificate is that
of the person presenting it or of a minor a guardian is
assisting. The existence of two related documents
produced by different issuers and for different
purposes may be confusing. For purposes of clarity,
the documentation submitted to the vital records
agencies will be referred to as the certificate of live
birth (CLB). The document issued by vital records
agencies to individuals for identification purposes will
be referred to as the birth certificate (BC).
Historically, hospitals and midwives issued BCs to
family members, but today in many cases, government
entities are the legitimate issuers.
Biometrics within passports and identity
documents has been incorporated [2]. The report titled
“Birth Certificate Fraud” issued in 2000 by the Office
of Inspector General of the U.S. Dept. of Health and
Human Services suggests that biometrics be considered
for incorporation in birth certificates [10]. The lack of
progress on that front may be an issue of cost and
technical capabilities. Another issue to consider is the
change a person undergoes from birth to adulthood.
There are few biometric identifiers that remain stable
from birth to death. The DNA profile is the only
biometric that remains stable from birth to death and
beyond. The dead have been identified by tissue
samples of an otherwise unrecognizable person or body
part. Having the DNA profile established at birth
allows for a person’s life to have a definitive beginning
for purposes of documentation and record keeping.
DNA analysis has become commonplace. It is
being used for food safety and food counterfeiting
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surveillance [23]. DNA analysis is being used for
defecation attribution [18]. The web site ancestry.com
is offering DNA analysis for $89 and has tested more
than 1.5 million people [6]. DNA analysis is quickly
approaching commodity status. The FBI has approved
a Rapid DNA Index System that will produce a
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) acceptable
DNA profile within one to two hours from sample
intake to result and requires no human intervention [7].
To date, the Rapid DNA system has not been approved
for CODIS profile submission when operated from
within a law enforcement booking station or agency.
However, this federal program’s technical achievement
is an indication that DNA analysis can eventually be
performed outside specialized laboratories.
This paper is an exploration of the potential
convergence of DNA analysis, birth records
management and identification document security.
This convergence promises to increase document
security significantly. The polymerase chain reaction
(PCR) short tandem repeat (STR) DNA profiling has
the potential to reliably link individuals to their birth
records at time of birth and provide a reliable means of
identity authentication many years later.
This
improved security, however, complicates birth
certificate issuance and maintenance for years to come.
Acceptability of universal DNA profiling will be
contingent upon safeguards to protect personal privacy
and safety. This paper raises some of the requirements
that need to be considered and discusses the challenges
they bring.
Document security is a multi-level
problem. The instance of the document must exhibit
various integrity and authenticity properties. The
system by which documents are issued and managed
also requires careful consideration. This paper focuses
on the individual birth record as opposed to document
management systems.
This paper explores past efforts related to this
topic and how DNA profiling could work in
conjunction with document security, and closes with a
discussion.

2. Past efforts
Numerous biometrics have been introduced to
address a number of identification and security
problems. Reliable individual recognition is critical to
many processes that require accurate authorization and
accountability. Biometric authentication has been
automated to verify or recognize the identity of a living
person based on a physiological or behavioral
characteristic [16, 17, 24, 25]. A few better known
physiological and behavioral characteristics currently
used for automatic identification include DNA,
fingerprints, voice, iris, retina, hand, face, handwriting,

keystroke, finger shape, as well as new measures, such
as gait, ear shape, head resonance, optical skin
reflectance and body odor. The ideal biometric
characteristic
has
five
qualities:
robustness,
distinctiveness,
availability,
accessibility
and
acceptability. The biometric should be: 1) unchanging
on an individual over time (“robust”); 2) showing great
variation over the population (“distinctive”); 3) that
members of the population should have multiple
instances of this measure (“available”); 4) ability to
image or capture the measure’s qualities using
electronic sensors (“accessible”); 5) that people do not
object to having this measurement taken of them
(“acceptability”) [16, 17, 19, 24]. Many uses of
biometrics have focused on IT systems and facilities
security [16, 17]. Performance based biometrics, such
as keystroke or gait, are unrealistic as a means to
authenticate an identity document given variety of
physical environments in which identity documents are
verified. The performance characteristics of an infant
are a poor indicator of how that person in adulthood
will perform (e.g. typing, walking). Fingerprints may
be the most compelling option available today, but
their size undergoes significant change from infancy to
adulthood [3].
Methods to embed DNA information in identity
documents have been proposed. Fuson applied for
patents that document methods for including DNA on a
birth certificate by either embedding an actual DNA
sample or incorporating a chip containing DNA data
[11, 12]. Other researchers have developed a printable
ink that contains DNA for identification [15,
21]. These approaches, however, are potentially more
costly and cumbersome than the technique presented
here, which encodes and transforms CODIS loci
information into a numerical value to be placed on the
tangible certificate as well as in the online vital records
entry. The transformation proposed in this article
considers the privacy risk of capturing DNA
information, which these past efforts do not adequately
address. In terms of the efficiency of using DNA as a
biometric, researchers at National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), are making
progress on reducing the processing time for PCRbased STR markers [22].

3. Genetics primer
Within the nucleus of each human cell are 23 pairs
of chromosomes.
The mother contributes one
chromosome to each pair and the other is from the
father.
Each chromosome is composed of
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). DNA is a double helix
structure that is designed to split into two strands
during cell division. The two strands are joined
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together by specialized chemical bonds between two
organic compounds. This bonded pair of compounds
is called a base pair. There are four distinct types of
base compounds. (A - adenine, T – thymine, G –
guanine, C – cytosine). Although the two strands are
chemically different they are complementary in terms
of information. This quality is derived by the special
nature of the bond between adenine and thymine and
the bond between guanine and cytosine. The catalog
of base pairs is limited to A-T, T-A, G-C and C-G.
This means a single strand of DNA dictates the
composition of the double helix because the second
strand must be composed of base compounds that will
bond. This pairing behavior is exploited in DNA
profiling.
The estimated number of base pairs among the 23
chromosome pairs is three billion [1]. Sequences of
base pairs function collectively to act as a gene. A
gene defines the chemical composition of proteins and
other organic compounds necessary for life. Not all of
the 3 billion base pairs appear to have an active part in
cellular biology. Genes and non-functional sequences
of base pairs are located on the same chromosome and
same starting point along the double helix. Genes and
non-functional sequences come in pairs, and are
located at the same location of the same chromosome
contributed by the mother and the chromosome
provided by the father.
The base compound
composition within these genes and non-functional
sequences can vary between maternal and paternal
chromosomes. An allele is a specific base compound
sequence of a gene or non-functional region. The term
genotype commonly refers to a pair of alleles where
each allele exists at the same specific location or locus
on the maternal and paternal chromosome within a
chromosome pair.
One composition dynamic within DNA is the
presence of STRs. STRs are repetitions of short
adjacent sequences consisting of base compounds,
such as TATA or GTAGTA along a single DNA
strand. The quantity of these tandem or adjacent
compound sequence repetitions defines the length of
the allele. For example, the allele designations for
D3S1358 shown in Table 1 signify length as the
number of times a particular expected base
combination sequence (i.e. AGAT or TCTA depending
on strand [9] ) repeats starting at the locus D3S1358.
An allele designated as 15 is one where 15 repetitions
of the expected base sequence occurred. An allele with
a decimal point value indicates the degree of
completion of the expected sequence within the last
repetition. A locus designator (e.g. D3S1358) starting
with D indicates the chromosome (e.g. chromosome 3)
and identifies a unique DNA segment (e.g. 1358) along
the chromosome. The other locus label conventions

seen in Table 1 follow historical naming that requires a
reference lookup to determine the actual location.
Although each chromosome pair consists of a
contribution from the mother and father, the
chromosome’s contributor cannot be attributed by
general characteristics such as length, orientation,
color, location, weight or shape. A reference
chromosome from the mother or father is needed for
partial sequencing and compared to the partial
sequencing of the offspring’s chromosome in order to
attribute origin. This is done in paternity cases, which
is not the purpose of the CODIS. In the criminal DNA
forensics context, attributing the parental origin of each
of the 46 chromosomes appears to be unnecessary [20].
Genotype notation is not an ordered list. The genotype
for D3S1358 of allele of 15, 16 is equivalent to 16, 15.
The parental origin of the particular DNA strand
containing the allele of 15 at D3S1358 is not
determined. During the PCR analysis process, DNA
strands are snipped apart bio-chemically and the
process does not maintain the information of which
pair member contributed to which snippet. This
property is utilized in the discussion regarding privacy.

4. Document security
When attempting to improve the reliability of
linkage between a person and their identity
documentation, the challenge is not identification
(seeking to know who an individual is from a
population), but a challenge of authentication or
verification (is the claimant truly the person identified
by document). Authentication requires that a person
be enrolled in order to initialize the identity and submit
a means by which this person will support their claim
of identity in the future.
Biometrics, in the context of identity documents,
have usage dynamics that are different from systems
security. The CLB is issued by a loosely coordinated
group of issuers, and the verifiers of identity are
unlikely to be those who issued the BC. For example,
a baby born in New York City (NYC) will have a birth
certificate issued by the NYC Department of Health,
and a verifier could be the Nebraska Department of
Motor Vehicles. The international dimension of
issuance and verification raises complexity even
further. Decentralized issuance and uncoordinated
verification lead to dynamics unlike those experienced
within a closed system.
The identity document issuer and verifier are
concerned about the document’s accuracy, authenticity
and integrity.
The verifier needs a means to
authenticate the document’s legitimacy as well as the
claimant-to-document relationship.
Birth records
without biometrics have fewer privacy implications for
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the individual being identified. Affixing valuable
immutable data such as DNA sequencing raises the
privacy risk a person experiences. The next sections
explore how DNA can be utilized for authentication,
propose a means to achieve privacy and suggest a
means to maintain authenticity and integrity.

4.1. Individual authentication
When considering the use of DNA to provide
authentication, the question being asked is “How can
DNA analysis be used to ensure the person claiming a
birth certificate is theirs is being honest?” Underlying
this question are questions related to the process of
DNA analysis, process reliability, results interpretation
and the chances and types of error.
DNA use in forensics has primarily been used to
aid the justice system in criminal and civil cases. The
notion of relating evidence (ex. blood sample, child
with disputed paternity) with individuals is
conceptually similar to relating a documented DNA
profile bound to an identity document to the person
who claims to be represented by that document. DNA
forensics analysis involves one or both of two
dominant methods. The two processes are the variable
numbers of tandem repeats (VNTR) process and the
PCR process. The PCR process depends on STRs and
is agile in terms of method acceleration and is highly
precise in its results. Disadvantages related to PCRbased STR methods are that the individuating power
per locus is lower and contamination during the
process has an exaggerated effect. The FBI uses the
PCR-based STR process to populate CODIS, which is
a collection of DNA profiles used in law enforcement.
As of January 2017, the system will use 20 core STR
loci, which is seven more loci than in DNA profiles
that exist prior to this date [14].
In order for CODIS to be successful as a law
enforcement and prosecutorial tool, the scientific basis
of the PCR-based STR profile utilized has undergone
significant review in the areas of genetics, reliability,
repeatability, population genetics and statistics.
Adoption of CODIS profiles as the basis for DNA
authentication of birth certificates is a reasonable
choice. Although the newest CODIS profile of 20 STR
loci has not been instituted operationally, it is formally
adopted. As long as the sample contains cells from
one DNA contributor, the PCR-based STR process
produces an unambiguous profile. However, there
remains the question of whether a fraudulent claimant
will be able to successfully authenticate (false positive)
or whether the proper claimant could be unsuccessful
in proving his/her claim (false negative).
In order to make these concepts more tangible, a
scenario of a fictional person called Jo is explored. Jo

is gender neutral. The core CODIS loci are autosomes,
meaning the loci are not located on the X-Y gender
chromosomes. Table 1 shows Jo’s CODIS DNA
profile.
Table 1: Jo’s CODIS DNA profile - compiled by
drawing from allele types and frequencies
published in the “Caucasian 2015 Expanded
FBI STR Loci Allele Frequencies” [8].
Locus
Genotype
Allele Frequencies
D3S1358
15, 16
0.2475, 0.2327
vWA
17, 18
0.2673, 0.2178
D16S539
12, 11
0.3416, 0.2723
CSF1PO
12, 11
0.3267, 0.2995
TPOX
8, 11
0.5470, 0.2550
D8S1179
13, 14
0.3342, 0.2054
D21S11
30, 29
0.2327, 0.1807
D18S51
14, 17
0.1757, 0.1535
D2S441
11, 14
0.3094, 0.2624
D19S433
14, 13
0.3490, 0.2797
TH01
9.3, 6
0.3045, 0.2252
FGA
22, 21
0.1881, 0.1757
D22S1045
15, 16
0.3639, 0.3168
D5S818
11, 12
0.4084, 0.3515
D13S317
11, 12
0.3119, 0.3094
D7S820
10, 11
0.2896, 0.2030
D10S1248
13, 14
0.3366, 0.2748
D1S1656
17.3, 15
0.1510, 0.1436
D12S391
18, 21
0.1757, 0.1337
D2S1338
17, 19
0.1931, 0.1510
Jo is as “common” as a Caucasian person can be
with the CODIS profile. Jo’s profile shows the
discriminating power of the CODIS scheme by
assembling a profile consisting of the two most
common alleles for each locus. At first glance it is
apparent that even the most common alleles for some
loci are not so common (ex. D18S51, D12S391). Jo is
the offspring of parents who happen to contribute the
most common alleles of each locus for Caucasians
within the sample used to produce the FBI reference
statistics table for Caucasians. A somewhat unusual
characteristic of this profile is that all genotypes are
heterozygous (the alleles contributed by the parents are
different). It would be reasonable to see at least one
genotype that is homozygous (the same allele
contributed by both parents).
These genotype
distinctions influence the statistical calculations. As
will be shown, homozygous genotype occurrence at a
locus is less frequent within a population and therefore
makes a profile more distinctive and less common.
According to the National Research Council
(NRC) report [1] recommendations adopted by the FBI
in the FBI Quality Assurance Standards document [5],
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the following are the common computations related to
DNA profiles.
Random-Match Probabilities:
Equation 1.A: 𝑝 ! + 𝑝 1 − 𝑝 𝜃 (homozygous)
Equation 1.B: 2𝑝! 𝑝!
(heterozygotes)
The letter p represents probability of an allele
occurring within a population, which the FBI are
calling frequency in their tables. The expression that
follows the squaring of p in equation 1.A is a
correction factor to adjust for the underlying
assumptions of a random mating population. Reality is
that females and males do not routinely seek mates
from random places (e.g. mother from Maine and
father from Oklahoma) within the U.S. Convenience is
a likely factor in most pairings and location and
demographic factors influence just how random
genotypes will be. There is a strong correlation of
homozygosity and the degree of familial relation
between mates, and isolated communities are likely to
have individuals with a higher degree of homozygosity
than what would occur if truly random mating were to
occur. Population groupings like Caucasian, African
American, and American Indian influence the
frequencies of occurrence of alleles within genotypes
and proper statistical calculations require that the
population group of the individual from which a profile
originates be considered. The θ is a constant that
addresses the degree of isolation of the community
from which an individual originates. The θ value is
recommended by the NRC to range from 0.01 to 0.03
of which 0.03 is considered highly conservative from a
false positive point of view. This is due to θ increasing
the probability of occurrence of a genotype, which in
turn suggests the genotype is less discriminating in a
particular circumstance.
Equation 1.B is fairly straightforward. The reason
for the doubling of the result is that the allele
frequency is independent of whether the allele source
was the mother or father. There are two opportunities
for the genotype to occur. The subscripts i and j refer
to a specific allele of a locus. Because 1.B is for
heterozygote genotypes, the alleles are not the same
and therefore i and j cannot be equal. Applying 1.B
to Jo’s profile and for the particular locus vWA, the
equation would be written as 2𝑝!" 𝑝!" = 2 ∗ 0.2676 ∗
0.2178 = 0.1152.
Equations 1.A and 1.B compute the probability
that a particular genotype occurs at a specific locus.
The statistical theory supporting this and other
computations depend on the loci being gender neutral
and not subject to natural selection.
A DNA profile consists of multiple loci, and the
discriminating power of the profile results from being

able to combine the probabilities or frequencies of the
observed genotypes to determine the uniqueness of the
overall profile. The product rule is the recommended
calculation of profile frequency [1]. This calculation
depends on the notion of linkage equilibrium among
the loci, which is the population genetics concept that
over time generations within populations will mate in
such a way the genotypes that occur in selection
neutral locations will occur independent of each other,
which allows us to treat the loci as independent random
variables necessary for the product rule to be valid.
Therefore a DNA profile’s frequency can be
determined by applying 1.A or 1.B to each observed
genotype depending on its homozygosity and
multiplying each genotype probability result together
using the product rule.
In the case of Jo, the profile frequency is 8.0493 x
10-19. This value is the match probability, which
measures the probability of this profile being presented
by someone else (i.e. false positive). These other
possible people are assumed to be random people
within the population, but not relatives. The most
challenging source of false positives is Jo’s relatives.
An identical twin is able to successfully authenticate.
Existence of identical twins should be documented on
the birth certificate, and other authentication controls
will be needed for that situation. Jo’s parents,
uncles/aunts, nieces/nephews have match probabilities
relative to Jo’s profile that are significantly higher.
The match probability of a parent, uncle/aunt, first
cousin matching Jo’s COIDS profile, consisting of the
two most common alleles for each locus, are 0.1351 (a
conservative estimate), 0.0336, 0.0161 respectively. A
distant unilineal relative of Jo’s has a match probability
of at least 0.0074. The formulae used for these match
probability calculations can be found in the NRC
report [1].
The birthing facility would be the appropriate
party to perform DNA profile enrollment. They have
physical possession of the infant and often have
witnessed the child’s birth. They also have the
medically trained staff to obtain and process a DNA
sample, which in time should require little laboratory
training. Infants born at home or in non-institutional
settings would need to be brought into an authorized
facility for a medical exam and formal birth
registration. The resulting DNA profile would be
translated into a data structure that addresses integrity,
authenticity and privacy requirements prior to CLB
submission to the vital records agency. The CLB
issuer should be the entity that provides assurances of
the DNA profile’s authenticity, because they
performed the DNA profile enrollment. The BC issuer
assures authenticity over the entire BC, but the CLB
issuer performed the enrolling DNA profile protocol.

2402

4.2. Privacy
In this discussion of privacy protection the most
significant assumption being made is that the DNA
profile be composed of PCR-based STRs or be
performed with a profiling protocol that characterizes a
person’s alleles with equal or better precision and
reliability.
With recorded lifespans occasionally exceeding
120 years, a solution involving DNA privacy should
target at least 150 years of protection. Privacy
protections would need to protect a person’s privacy
from the first minutes after birth when the birth is
documented to their death. Individuals are born nearly
every second of every day. The privacy time clock is
reset for each of these births.
A birth record
management system will need to institute new
protections regularly in order to provide 150 years of
privacy protection for each subsequent newborn. A
privacy concern is that genetic relatives are a threat to
each other in terms of DNA privacy. An older birth
record for a grandparent may be a privacy concern for
their grandchildren. Having the DNA profile directly
readable on the birth certificate raises significant
privacy concerns.
Although the PCR STR loci are chosen to be
ideally non-functioning regions within chromosomes,
some loci are related to genes. Often loci are selected
from regions of chromosomes that are not relevant
genetically to diseases or subject to natural selection
[1, 13].
Using the FBI profiling schema should avoid
medically sensitive portions of the DNA. This is a
positive privacy accommodation that reduces medical
privacy threats to the profile data. However, the
immutable nature of DNA and the similarity among
relatives raises the concern that the profile in
unscrupulous hands would be used maliciously against
the individual or a family member or an entity trusting
the validity of the DNA authentication process.
Although statistics are required to determine the
significance of a match, statistics and judgment are not
used to determine the profile and evaluate whether a
match has occurred. The precision of the PCR-based
STR process allows for exact determination of the
genotype at each locus each time it is properly utilized.
Unlike other biometrics, DNA profile determination is
consistent and controlled. The final results are highly
repeatable, and therefore the match determination is a
simple logical evaluation.
The authentication
evaluation is, “Do both the documented profile and
provided profile contain the same genotype at each
loci?” A PCR-based STR profile match is accepted or
rejected based on complete agreement between two

profiles. The DNA profile is an immutable and innate
passphrase every person possesses.
A requirement for privacy protections is that they
can complicate but must not prevent effective
authentication and authenticity verification. In order to
provide privacy for this “bio-phrase,” one can take a
page from the history of passphrase protection. One
can construct a DNA profile and encode it into a
structured profile data unit (PDU), and perform oneway cryptographic transformations on that PDU that
produces a unique result. These transformations limit
the ability to restore and determine the contents of the
original PDU, which contains the DNA profile, while
preserving the distinctiveness of the DNA profile.
Cryptographic hash functions like SHA-2 or SHA-3
are algorithms that suffice today. By avoiding a
reversible process, such as encryption, there is no need
to rely on secrecy of decryption keys to maintain
privacy protection.
However, another page in
passphrase history is the offline attack on passphrases.
The equivalent attack would be for an attacker to gain
access to a birth record and attempt to determine the
DNA profile by postulating numerous, possibly
millions, DNA profiles and transforming them until an
attacker’s attempts result in a match.
Returning to Jo’s profile, a simple concatenation
of the genotypes would allow us to construct a biophrase without losing profile information. Prior to
applying cryptographic algorithms the genotype data
would undergo simple pre-processing. First step is to
sort the locus allele pairs to force consistency of
placement of allele values within the PDU. Next is to
normalize them into three digit integers by multiplying
each allele value by 10. Each result under 100 would
have a zero prepended. This process avoids parsing
ambiguity within the PDU contents.
Finally,
concatenating the normalized allele values to from
genotype sub-strings. Table 2 shows results of the
encoding steps in context of Jo’s DNA profile. There
is an opportunity to improve privacy by randomly
concatenating the genotype sub-strings when forming
the PDU. The order of loci provided in Table 1 is not
significant to the interpretation of the DNA profile. By
randomly ordering the profile loci, 20! possible
genotype sub-string orderings are introduced. Precomputation attacks, such as rainbow tables, will be
more difficult to execute. The order of the genotypes
would be documented and accessible to the verifier in
order to assemble the genotype sub-strings into the
correct order during verification.
It is reasonable to anticipate that different DNA
profiling protocols will be introduced over time and
ambiguity regarding the protocol must be avoided
when verifying an individual’s BC. The DNA profile
protocol identifier, loci order pattern and CLB record
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identifier would be among the accessible fields of the
BC in order for a verifier to reproduce the PDU
generated during enrollment. The genotype ordering
pattern metadata, CLB record identifier, DNA profiling
protocol identifier would also be incorporated as part
of the PDU thus ensuring the loci pattern, correct CLB
record and profiling process are used or referenced
during verification. The PDU is hashed using a
cryptographic hash function. The result is submitted
along with other CLB fields to the appropriate vital
records agency.

Table 2: Encoding of Jo’s profile
Profile
Sorted
Genotype
Long Short Sub-string
Result
D3S1358
15
16
16
15
160150
vWA

17

18

18

17

180170

D16S539

12

11

12

11

120110

CSF1PO

12

11

12

11

120110

TPOX

8

11

11

8

110080

D8S1179

13

14

14

13

140130

D21S11

30

29

30

29

300290

D18S51

14

17

17

14

170140

D2S441

11

14

14

11

140110

D19S433

14

13

14

13

140130

TH01

9.3

6

9.3

6

093060

FGA

22

21

22

21

220210

D22S1045

15

16

16

15

160150

D5S818

11

12

12

11

120110

D13S317

11

12

12

11

120110

D7S820

10

11

11

10

110100

D10S1248

13

14

14

13

140130

D1S1656

17.3

15

17.3

15

173150

D12S391

18

21

21

18

210180

D2S1338

17

19

19

17

190170

4.3. Integrity and authenticity
Integrity and authenticity of document content can
be assured through specialized documentation
materials and printing processes used to issue a BC.
Integrity and authenticity of the electronic CLB will
require digital security controls. Similar digital data
security controls will prove useful for digital data
stored on the BC. The integrity of all of the various

CLB fields including the DNA profile (contained
within the protected PDU) and supporting profile fields
must be verifiable as an ensemble within the CLB and
BC.
Performing a cryptographic checksum
incorporating all of the birth record (CLB or BC) data
fields can enable record integrity verification.
However, the cryptographic checksum could be
substituted with a new value that incorporates
fraudulent changes. To prevent substitution of the
checksum, data authenticity services are required. The
CLB issuer will authenticate the protected PDU as well
as authenticate the overall CLB.
The distinct
authentication on the protected PDU is necessary for
BC content validation.
Anticipating coordination among CLB submitting
institutions, vital records agencies and BC validators is
not practical. Therefore, authenticating BC content
cannot be dependent upon shared secrets. Digital
signatures can provide the authenticity services needed.
This will complicate BCs further, because the publickey certificates of both the CLB submitter and the vital
records agency must be accessible to the verifier in
order to validate the digital signatures covering BC
content.
The introduction of public-key certificates leads
directly to the requirement of a public key
infrastructure. Public-key certificates need to be issued
by an entity each validator can trust. There are more
than 6,400 authorized CLB submitters in the U.S. and
those organizations that grant CLB submission
authorization would be the natural parties to issue the
CLB submitter’s public-key certificate. For these
purposes, the BC validator would be better served by a
flat certificate authority hierarchy thus improving the
BC’s ability to be self-contained.
A validating
apparatus could be configured with a managed
repository of trusted public-key certificates for each
certificate authority that may have signed the CLB
submitter and BC issuer public-key certificates.
Adding DNA profile information and related
information will increase the amount of accessible
information significantly. Digital signatures would
complement printed seals, and will be easier for a
verification apparatus to accurately authenticate. A
contactless storage device integrated into the certificate
material should store all BC fields and any additional
information not visible on the BC. Printing protected
PDU information on the BC should be considered
carefully. Visual BC replicas will pose a threat to the
protected PDU in the long term. Copies of the BC will
not update in the event that privacy and authenticity
protections on the official BC document and digital
content are refreshed.
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4.4. Summary of services
The binding between the individual and their BC
is provided by a DNA profile produced using a
validated DNA profiling protocol. The genotypes are
randomly organized and concatenated with additional
context information to form a PDU that is
cryptographically hashed. The CLB issuer digitally
signs the protected PDU.
The BC issuer will
incorporate the protected PDU and corresponding CLB
digital signature within an issued BC. Public-key
certificates for the CLB and BC issuers will be
incorporated with BC content in order for the verifier
to validate the BC’s contents authenticity. The BC
issuer will digitally sign across all of the BC’s
contents.
CLB Issuer
DNA Sample
Individual

DNA Profiling Protocol

Genotypes

Enrollment PDU Formation
Enrollment PDU

Cryptographic Hash
Computation
Protected Enrollment PDU

Digital Signature Generation
Protected Enrollment PDU,
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CLB Record Enrollment

Vital Records Agency

BC Issuance
Individual

Figure 1: Depiction of DNA profile generation
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Figure 2: Depiction of DNA profile verification
At identity verification, BC contents are
authenticated and the claimant’s DNA profile is
produced using the same profiling protocol used at
enrollment. A claimant version of the protected PDU
is generated and compared to the enrolled version. If a

match does not occur, the claimant is not the same
person enrolled on the document or a profiling protocol
error occurred. If a match occurs, without revealing
the submitted DNA profile, a verifier’s profiling
apparatus will produce match probabilities using the
claimant’s DNA profile and current population
statistics for use in match significance determination.

5. Discussion
The CODIS profile was selected as a potential
DNA profiling protocol because it has an established
scientific pedigree on which to base this discussion. A
more sensitive identity-profiling protocol could be
introduced and validated with the same rigor as CODIS
profiles. Identifying and the preserving the parental
origin of the alleles may improve DNA profile
reliability, but the reference-parent’s privacy, likely the
birth mother, is at additional risk. If a substitute
protocol produces a repeatable sequence of
discriminating information that undergoes a literal
value match, the privacy suggestions discussed in this
paper may apply.
DNA based document authentication has great
potential to detect fraudulent claims by genetic
strangers attempting to impersonate. Relatives pose a
comparatively high false positive risk. Prosecutors
introduce additional evidence to rule out relatives
being involved in a crime. Requiring additional
documents may not be an option for a verifier because
the BC may be the only legitimate document available
for identity verification. Verifiers can avoid some
fraud attempts by determining that age and gender of
the claimant is consistent with what is documented on
the BC. Verifiers would need to accept that there is a
risk of a relative successfully posing as the claimed
identity. Assuming CODIS profiles are adopted,
research may be needed to determine how common
“CODIS twins” (relatives with matching CODIS
profiles) are within the U.S. population. This would
aid in determining the fraud potential posed by
relatives.
International adoption of DNA enhanced birth
records is anticipated to be staggered over time due to
factors including costs, priorities, societal values and
logistical complexity. Traditional visible contents of
the BC on enhanced BCs can be used by jurisdictions
not able to validate available DNA enhanced data.
Those claimants without DNA enhanced birth
certificates will not be able to provide a higher level of
identity assurance, but “DNA enhanced” jurisdictions
will likely rely on the policies they have today for
accepting and performing identification using foreign
BCs. Many nations will want to influence the choice
of DNA profiling protocol they utilize. A United
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Nations organization similar to the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) may be the proper
forum to negotiate details in the areas like DNA
profiling, PDU structure, contactless storage and
cryptography. Each chosen DNA profiling protocol
will need corresponding statistical analyses of the
ethnic populations residing in the nations that adopt the
protocol, which will need to be shared across
jurisdictions. International standards and agreements
will be needed to avoid an overabundance of DNA
enhancement approaches that would make international
compatibility costly and technically challenging.
Failure to verify a legitimate claimant (false
negative) results from contamination or test execution
errors.
An authoritative report recommends
independent re-testing to address false negative
concerns [1]. The PCR process involves amplifying
the quantity of alleles at each locus making it highly
unlikely the alleles are mischaracterized.
This
precision nearly guarantees that if a true match is
possible that match will occur. False negatives using
PCR-based STR should be expected to be rare using
properly executed procedures. Genetic chimerism is
one of possibly other rare naturally occurring genetic
conditions that could result in a false negative.
DNA profiling has the potential to upgrade the
legitimacy of birth certificates, and improve the
reliability of documents such as passports, visas,
school records and license documents. Missing person
records could be populated with DNA enhanced birth
record information drawn from the CLB or BC. Loved
ones could find closure from accidents that may have
significantly damaged human remains. DNA analysis
is not novel in these use cases, but to have a reliable,
comprehensive collection of DNA enhanced birth
records may improve identification in these situations.
An open-ended victim identity search with limited
search constraints will prove to be difficult because of
the privacy protections on the CLB records, and the
variation of DNA profiling protocols used historically
may require several profiles to be generated. With
sufficient access, resources and time, the victim’s
identity could be determined.
DNA profiles are fundamentally immutable and
are reusable authenticators. This combination puts
pressure on DNA privacy. Identity thieves need not
resort to cryptanalysis, but can obtain DNA samples
that are left behind in daily routines or at times of
enrollment or verification. Record level security
cannot address these threats, but these threats should be
considered systematically when evaluating DNA
profiles as a document security feature.
A 150-year security requirement for protecting a
historically static low privacy risk record will unsettle
birth record management. Adding protected DNA

profiles will introduce digital authenticity and privacy
requirements that must be met under threats that will
span over a century or more for every registered
person. Cryptanalysis techniques and computational
power will improve over time. Public-key certificates
are commonly set to expire in time periods under a
century to minimize risk from lost private keys or
weakened cryptographic algorithms.
One-way
transformations may leak more original information
with improved cryptanalysis. Contactless storage
device lifetimes will need to be extended or be
periodically replaced securely. DNA profiling
protocols will change over time causing support for
legacy DNA profiles to be burdensome for verifiers.
These factors challenge the low maintenance tradition
of birth record management. It may be necessary for
CLBs and BCs to undergo a periodic refresh in order to
utilize an updated DNA profile protocol and improve
data protections. A cost benefit analysis performed
today may show DNA profiling unattractive, but as
DNA analysis becomes routine, policy-makers should
not lose sight of the privacy consequences. Securing
birth records with DNA profiles appears to be within
reach, but should be done cautiously.
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